This paper emerges from the failure of the traditional models of hyperinflation with perfect foresight. Insights from two standard optimizing monetary settings and economic reasoning from case studies of extreme hyperinflation episodes provide relevant requirements for the specification of the demand for money during hyperinflation. The paper demonstrates that the possibility of perfect foresight monetary hyperinflation paths depends robustly on the essentiality of money. The essentiality of money provides some depth of explanation of the reasons why the popular semi-log schedule of the demand for money is not appropriate for analysing monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight. The paper proposes a simple test of money essentiality for the appropriate specification of the demand-for-money equation in empirical studies of hyperinflation.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional monetary models of hyperinflation rely on the famous Cagan (1956) semi-log schedule of the demand for money and consider the monetization of a large fiscal deficit as the driving force of this unstable process (Bruno and Fischer, 1990; Evans and Yarrow, 1981) . These models aim at explaining the emergence and the development of monetary hyperinflations, 1 i.e. the speeding up of the inflation process driven by monetary growth during which real cash balances tend to vanish. These models are so influential in the literature that small variations of them can be found in the major textbooks on macroeconomics or monetary economics, such as Walsh (2003) . Moreover, the large empirical literature on hyperinflation ( Petrovic and Mladenovic, 2010 , among the most recent empirical studies) relies on these traditional models with the purpose of identifying a stable demand for money to explain the behaviour of real cash balances and inflation during such extreme events.
However, the failure of traditional monetary models of hyperinflation with perfect foresight has been long established. Since the 'surprising monetarist arithmetic' of Buiter (1987) , economists have recognized that this class of models is not able to generate monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight. Furthermore, many empirical studies question the validity of the Cagan schedule by finding that the semi-log functional form of the demand for money substantially 1. This paper is not about speculative hyperinflations which are the focus of other works such as Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) , Barbosa and Cunha (2003) , or Arce (2009) for example. Speculative hyperinflations, as defined by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) , are explosive price-level paths unrelated to monetary growth.
underpredicts (Cagan, 1956; Flood and Garber, 1980) , or cannot explain (Engsted, 1998; Petrovic and Vujosevic, 1996) , the demand for money in the latter stages of some hyperinflations. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, the paper aims at understanding the failure of traditional models of hyperinflation with perfect foresight in an attempt to explain that this failure can be attributable to the popular semi-log functional form for the demand for money. Analytical argumentation and economic reasoning drawing on empirical literature and case studies of extreme hyperinflation episodes provide relevant requirements for the specification of the demand for money during hyperinflation. Second, relying on the explanation of the failure of traditional models, the paper aims at contributing to the applied literature by offering criteria for the specification of an appropriate functional form for the demand for money during hyperinflation. These criteria may help empirical studies of hyperinflationary episodes in specifying the demand for real cash balances. Although hyperinflationary episodes are rare, they regularly generate a significant amount of empirical studies. The recent Zimbabwean hyperinflation, as the second most extreme hyperinflation in monetary history after the Hungarian episode of 1946 (Hanke and Kwok, 2009; Pilossof, 2009) , will surely stimulate new empirical studies.
Traditional monetary models of hyperinflation based on Cagan (1956) imply the possibility of dual equilibria and the existence of an inflation tax Laffer curve. All models that generate the high-inflation trap defined by Bruno and Fischer (1990) fail to produce monetary hyperinflation. 2 Evans and Yarrow (1981) and Bernholz and Gersbach (1992) already have pointed out that the crucial condition for generating hyperinflation is that real money balances should not decrease more than inflation increases with high rates of inflation. In adopting the latter point the literature has followed two different approaches. The first approach includes in the models a mechanism of slow adjustment of some nominal variable like expected inflation (Bruno and Fischer, 1990; Marcet and Nicolini, 2003) or money holdings (Kiguel, 1989) . The second approach maintains perfect foresight by assuming that agents most likely respond instantaneously to changes in inflation during hyperinflation, but abandons the Cagan money demand function. Vazquez (1998) , Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) or Barbosa et al. (2006) develop monetary optimizing models to obtain a demand for real cash balances compatible with explosive hyperinflation and perfect foresight. We follow this second approach. This paper considers two standard continuous-time and nonstochastic optimizing monetary settings as representing alternative ways of modelling the transaction role of money: a money-in-the-utility-function model (MIUF model) and a cash-inadvance model (CIA model). The aim is to examine the requirements for the appropriate specification of the demand for money for the study of hyperinflation. 3 Building on the Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) model, the paper studies two new monetary optimizing setups by applying general household's preferences while drawing systematically on actual hyperinflation experiences to complete the argumentation. In studying two different monetary settings to look for the robustness of the results, this paper demonstrates that, in both frameworks, monetary hyperinflation can arise consistently with perfect foresight under the similar condition. This condition states that households should consider the money sufficiently essential to the system. Drawing on theoretical and empirical literature and case studies of most extreme hyperinflation episodes, the requirement of sufficient money essentiality is shown to provide some depth of explanation and to rely consistently on economic intuition. In this respect, the paper contributes to the understanding of the well-known failure of Cagan inflationary finance models with perfect foresight. Moreover, it provides a test for the specifications of the demand-formoney function designed for empirical studies of monetary hyperinflation. This paper is organized in the following manner. Sections 2 and 3 consider, respectively, a MIUF and a CIA model with a general characterization of the representative agent's preferences. Empirical literature and case studies of actual hyperinflations complete the argumentation. Section 4 offers some criteria for the appropriate specification of the demand for money during hyperinflation and alternatives to the Cagan semi-log schedule for empirical studies. Section 5 finishes the analysis with summarizing and concluding remarks.
MIUF ECONOMY, HYPERINFLATION AND MONEY ESSENTIALITY
We extend the basic setup of Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) first, by considering general utility functions and second, by taking into account the goods market equilibrium condition. The optimizing monetary model is a continuous-time model (assumption [A1]) where the economy consists of a large number of identical, infinitely lived, forward looking households endowed with perfect foresight (assumption [A2]). Population is constant, and its size is normalized to unity for convenience (assumption [A3]). There is no uncertainty (assumption [A4]). Each household has a nonproduced endowment y t 40 of the nonstorable consumption good per unit of time (assumption [A5]).
The MIUF model assumes that the role of money as a medium of exchange is captured by introducing real money balances into the household utility function. Our MIUF framework considers household preferences represented by a general class of utility functions (assumption [A6]). Therefore, the representative household utility at time 0 is
The instantaneous utility function has standard properties (assumption [A7]): it is continuous, twice differentiable for positive values of its arguments, increasing and strictly concave in c t , the household's consumption at time t, and m t ¼ M t =P t his holdings of real monetary balances (M is the nominal stock of money, P is the price level). The rate r is the subjective discount rate which is assumed to be equal to the real rate of interest (assumption [A8]). Households can hold money and bonds paying a nominal interest i t (assumption [A9]). Real per capita financial wealth and the nominal interest rate are defined as
respectively, where b t denotes real per capita government debt, p t is the inflation rate. The household allocates its resources between consumption, gross accumulation of real money balances and bonds. The household's budget constraint is
where t t is a lump-sum tax assumed to be constant. The household's optimization problem leads to the following first-order condition:
where U 0 c (c t , m t ) is constant with respect to time because the instantaneous rate of time preference is equal to the real rate of interest. Condition (3) requires that at each moment the nominal rate of interest is equal to the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for money. This condition implicitly defines a demand for money as a function of the nominal interest rate i. The optimum solution is completed by the transversality condition:
The setup is completed by considering the equilibrium condition in the goods market. Following Barbosa et al. (2006) or Vazquez (1998, p. 438) , 'in the spirit of the traditional approach to the study of hyperinflationary phenomena, we assume that output and government expenditures are constant'. Hence, the market for goods is in equilibrium when a constant supply of good y equals household consumption and constant per capita government expenditures (g):
In usual inflationary finance models, a constant per capita government budget deficit, d, is financed by issuing high-powered money (assumption [A10]):
Substituting the value of p extracted from first-order equation (3) in the latter expression leads to the inflationary finance model dynamics described by the following law of motion for real cash balances:
Differential equation (7) provides a complete characterization of real per-capita money balances dynamics which is studied by using the technique of the phase diagram on [0; þ 1[. The principal point of interest here is to examine whether this law of motion for real cash balances is able to produce hyperinflation paths. An explosive hyperinflation path will be observed if the law of motion presents a path leading to a zero level of real cash balances. Therefore, the conditions for this kind of path should be identified. As the mathematical function representing the law of motion is continuous (which is true with standard assumptions on U), this kind of path will be observed as long as (dropping the index time for convenience):
The calculation of lim m!þ1 _ m will assess the existence of any steady state. Regardless of the number of steady states, since we focus on possible explosive hyperinflation paths, we are only interested in the paths starting to the left of the steady state associated with the lowest level of real money balances when the condition lim m!0 þ _ m < 0 is met. Figure 1 illustrates this point. According to Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) in the context of speculative hyperinflations issue, any path leading to a zero value of real cash balances and eventually crossing the vertical axis at some finite point should be ruled out on grounds that such paths would not be feasible since the real stock of money would eventually become negative. Barbosa and Cunha (2003, p. 192) contested the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983) approach. They argued that on such hyperinflationary paths 'when the real quantity of money reaches zero hyperinflation would have wiped out the value of money, the opportunity cost of holding money would have become infinite', and 'the economy would no longer be a monetary economy'.
We follow the main point made by Barbosa and Cunha (2003) and consider the explosive hyperinflation paths corresponding to the condition lim m!0 þ _ m < 0 as perfect foresight competitive equilibrium paths. However, we adopt a slightly different view and consider these hyperinflationary paths where lim m!0 þ _ m < 0 as paths where real cash balances m t will tend to zero and approach zero but will not reach the strictly exact value of m t 5 0. As real cash balances are defined by m t ¼ M t =P t , with M t denoting the nominal stock of money and P t the price level, real cash balances can be strictly equal to zero only if M t 5 0. The value of real cash balances can tend to zero and approach the value of zero, meaning that the price level P t tends to plus infinity (or more precisely tends to plus infinity more rapidly than M t may), but it cannot strictly be zero. One may notice that the famous Cagan demand for money is not defined for m t 5 0. The Cagan demand for real cash
Monetary dynamics in a MIUF economy with money sufficiently essential.
balances may tend to zero as inflation rates tend to infinity alongside a hyperinflationary path, but it will never be equal to zero. In the same way, for example, the logarithmic utility function U(c, m) 5 log c þ b log m, with b a positive constant, leads to the differential equation _ m ¼ d À bc þ rm for which the phase locus eventually crosses the vertical axis. It is straightforward to verify that if d/cob, this differential equation exhibits hyperinflationary paths along which real cash balances m will tend to zero and approach zero, but it is not defined for the point m 5 0. Therefore, along such hyperinflationary paths m will tend to zero and approach zero but will never reach the point m 5 0.
The economic intuition lying behind the point corresponding to m t 5 0 is clearly the simple abandonment or suspension of the currency as a legal tender. The abandonment of the currency would mean that the whole nominal stock of money would be entirely worthless because its use just ceased to exist. This exact situation occurred in August 1946 in Hungary when the pengo + was replaced by the forint. More recently, the same situation occurred in April 2009 in Zimbabwe when the economic planning minister announced the suspension of the local currency thereby effectively 'terminating' the Zimbabwean dollar and replacing it with a full scale dollarization system. The abandonment of the currency implies a worthless value of the nominal stock of money and may occur in a hyperinflationary path context. However, we do not consider this as the end point of the hyperinflationary path because there are virtually no limits to the hyperinflationary escalation.
The three most extreme hyperinflations in monetary history illustrate this later point. In January 1994 in Yugoslavia, during the third most severe hyperinflation of monetary history, the highest monthly inflation rate reached 309 Â 10 6 %, corresponding to a daily inflation rate of 64.6% and implying prices doubling every 1.4 days. In November 2008, in Zimbabwe, the second most severe hyperinflation in monetary history, the monthly inflation rate, as calculated by Hanke and Kwok (2009) , reached 79.6 Â 10 9 %, equivalent to a daily inflation rate of 98% and implying prices doubling every 24.7 hours. The most severe hyperinflation of the monetary history, the Hungarian hyperinflation of 1946, registered the highest monthly inflation rate of 1.295 Â 10 16 % in July 1946, equivalent to a daily inflation rate of 195% and implying prices doubling every 15 hours. These impressive examples illustrate that the worst hyperinflation may be even worse, meaning that these inflation rates may have been even higher. In comparison, the famous hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic of Germany takes the fourth position of the most extreme hyperinflations in monetary history with the highest monthly inflation rate of 'only' 29,525% in October 1923, corresponding to a daily inflation rate of 20.9% and implying prices doubling every 3.7 days. 4 It is decisive to stress that the possible explosive hyperinflationary paths are explosive monetary hyperinflations because, along these paths, the rate of growth of the money supply explodes. Rewriting government budget constraint as
4. The data for the highest monthly inflation rates in Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, Hungary and Weimar Germany can be found in Hanke and Kwok (2009) and Bernholz and Kugler (2009) . The corresponding daily inflation rates and the time required for prices to double are the results of our own calculations.
r 2011 The Author German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik demonstrates that along the paths of continuously declining m, given that d40, the growth rate of the money supply increases continuously. In this respect, according to the law of motion (7), the possibility of explosive hyperinflation will depend on the condition
The latter condition is fundamentally a condition about a sufficient level of the essentiality of money along a hyperinflationary path. Scheinkman (1980) considered money as essential in a hyperinflation context if the inflation tax collected by the government does not tend to zero when the rate of inflation explodes. The interpretation of such a condition is that 'no matter how expensive it becomes to hold money people still hold a large quantity of it; that is money is very necessary to the system' (Scheinkman, 1980, p. 96) . 5 From (6) we see that seigniorage obtained by printing money can be separated into two components, the change in the real stock of money and the inflation tax pm. According to equation (3), the inflation tax can be written
Then, when the rate of inflation explodes, we consider
Therefore, when lim m!0 þ ðU 0 m ðc; mÞ=U 0 c ðc; mÞm Â Ã > 0 then lim m!0 þ ½pm > 0 and money is essential. Hence, the money essentiality means that the value of money services remains strictly positive even when the inflation rates skyrocket. Money is so useful to private agents for their transactions that they always will keep a certain amount of it, no matter how expensive it may become. These findings enable us to formulate a first proposition.
Proposition 1. In a MIUF economy, characterized by the set of assumptions [A1] to [A10], explosive monetary hyperinflations are possible only if money is sufficiently essential, that is if
Proof. The proof relies on the previous arguments and can be illustrated by the phase diagram depicted on Figure 1 . The precise shape of the phase diagram depends on the first and second derivative of _ m with respect to m. Other shapes than that depicted on Figure 1 could be possible for the phase locus. An important point is that the analysis conducted here insists on the condition for lim m!0 þ _ m < 0;
5. This definition of the essentiality of money is also used in Sturzenegger (1994) or Barbosa and Cunha (2003) for example in the context of speculative hyperinflationary paths. It should be noticed that the concept of 'money essentiality' is itself the subject of substantive other research.
thus, our analysis focuses only on the paths leading to a zero value of real cash balances. If lim m!þ1 _ m > 0, the locus _ m will cross the horizontal axis at least once. Figure 1 considers a unique and unstable steady state m * but the qualitative analysis for explosive hyperinflationary paths does not change in the case of more steady states. All paths starting to the right of m* are hyperdeflationary paths that can be ruled out because they would violate the transversality condition (4). All paths starting to the left of m * are explosive hyperinflations paths. & Using a similar MIUF framework with a constant-relative-risk-aversion utility function, Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) point out that explosive hyperinflationary dynamics are more likely when the transaction role of money becomes important. Our results confirm and extend to more generality the point made by Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004) by relating the possibility of monetary explosive hyperinflations to a sufficient level of money essentiality in the model.
Explosive hyperinflation paths starting to the left of m* are equilibrium paths since they are consistent with equilibrium condition on the goods market (5). Along these paths of declining real cash balances, real per capita consumption will remain constant at c t 5 y À g, but households will suffer from an increasing loss of welfare representing the harmful effect of hyperinflation on the economy.
Proposition 1 states that the higher the fiscal deficit to be financed through money creation, the higher the value of money services. This means that the higher the fiscal deficit, the more essential the money should be to make the development of hyperinflation feasible in the MIUF framework. The economic intuition of the requirement of sufficient money essentiality for the possibility of monetary hyperinflation is multifaceted. First, in this inflationary finance model where the fiscal deficit is financed through seigniorage, the government crucially needs the money to be essential to the private agents in order to get sufficient inflation tax when inflation explodes. Hyperinflation is the means by which the government exploits the essentiality of money to get sufficiently large inflation tax to finance its fiscal deficit. The level of real cash holdings is the tax base of the inflation tax. In this perfect foresight environment, we see from (6) that alongside the hyperinflationary path, the inflation tax has to grow at the same pace that _ m decreases in order to keep d constant. Inflationary finance models of hyperinflation need the inflation tax to be still sufficient to generate the required amount of seigniorage, even when the inflation rates explode and real cash balances shrink. This situation demands that the agents hold sufficiently large real cash balances even when inflation rates skyrocket. The private agents will hold sufficiently large real cash balances if they consider money essential for the transactions. If money was not essential, hyperinflation could not be possible because it could not succeed in raising sufficient inflation tax to satisfy the government budget constraint given by (6). The higher the fiscal deficit is, the more efficient the inflation tax should be. This situation demands that the money be sufficiently essential.
Transactions require the use of domestic money, even during extreme hyperinflations, because, as mentioned by Casella and Feinstein (1990) , there is a general unwillingness to resort to barter among the agents. Money is essential for the transactions. It is also worth noticing that, as pointed out by Gutierrez and Vazquez (2004, p. 312) , money becomes more essential for purchasing goods during hyperinflation than during stable periods 'because extreme inflation dramatically decreases credit transactions, and in general, the use of long-term contracts'. r 2011 The Author German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik Economic agents avoid long-term contracts during hyperinflation because of the rapid depreciation of money. The instability in relative price movements, as reported by Tang and Wang (1993) for example, contributes also to the avoidance of long-term contracts because of the uncertainty of their outcomes.
The essentiality of money does not depend only on the transaction technology but also on the institutional framework. By declaring the money to be the unique legal tender in the economy, the government can enforce the essentiality of money for transactions. Casella and Feinstein (1990) reported that domestic money is required for transactions because of legal restrictions prohibiting the use or the holding of foreign currency. In the case of the recent extreme hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, for example, the use of foreign currency in transactions was strictly forbidden thereby enforcing the use of Zimbabwe dollars for everyday transactions up until the very end of hyperinflation (see Pilossof, 2009 , for anecdotal evidence on this issue). By requiring some fiscal taxes or some parastatal services to be paid with money transactions, the government can enforce a sufficient level of money essentiality, and consequently, a sufficient level of the inflation tax. For example, Pilossof (2009, p. 295) reports that at the last stages of the recent Zimbabwean hyperinflation in early 2009, the second most severe in the monetary history, the population needed Zimbabwe dollars to pay 'parastatal bills and rates -water, phone and electricity'.
Another economic intuition of the proposition of the requirement of money essentiality for the possibility of monetary hyperinflation is significant. As originally explained by Cagan (1956) , hyperinflation is the result of the monetarist process of real cash balances adjusting to ever-lower desired real cash balances within the substitution process between money and goods. The fact that hyperinflation may develop means in itself that money is used for the transactions. The hyperinflationary process may develop only because the agents need to use the money for the transactions. Since money is the medium of hyperinflation, hyperinflation can develop only because money is essential for the transactions. The fact that money is essential for the transactions explains the release by the government of banknotes of ever-higher values alongside the hyperinflation path. The development of hyperinflation and the essentiality of money for the transactions require the issue of ever larger denominations banknotes. The three most extreme hyperinflations of the monetary history illustrate this point. The highest denomination banknote issued by the National Bank of Yugoslavia in fall 1993 was the five hundred billion or 500 Â 10 9 dinars banknote. The largest value banknote issued by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in January 2009 was the one hundred trillion or 10 14 dollars banknote. In the case of the most extreme hyperinflation of monetary history, the highest denomination banknote issued by the Hungarian National Bank in 1946 was the one hundred million b.-pengo + (one hundred million billion pengo +, with billion here meaning 10 12 ) or 10 20 pengo + banknote. In the late stage of the famous German hyperinflation, the highest denomination banknote issued by the Reichsbank was the one hundred trillion or 10 14 marks banknote.
Considering the particular case where the utility function is additively separable in consumption and real cash balances:
where the functions u and v are continuous, twice differentiable for positive values of their arguments, increasing in their respective argument and strictly concave [assumption A7 0 ], the condition (9) of Proposition 1 resumes to lim m!0 þ mv 0 ðmÞ ½ > du 0 ðcÞ: ð10Þ
In the latter condition, the value of u 0 (c) is constant with respect to time and can be replaced by u 0 (y À g) using the goods market equilibrium condition (5). Scheinkman (1980) related the condition lim m!0 þ mv 0 ðmÞ > 0 to the essentiality of money. The condition (10), as a particular case of Proposition 1, states that the possibility of explosive hyperinflation depends on a sufficient level of money essentiality that is conveyed by the utility function for money services. According to Proposition 1, the failure of the Cagan inflationary finance model to produce explosive hyperinflations with perfect foresight is not surprising. The Cagan ad-hoc model relying on the Cagan money demand can be considered as a special case of the MIUF model developed here. Since Kingston (1982) , it is known that the semi-log schedule is 'integrable'. According to the latter, it means that the schedule 'can be generated by at least one optimizing framework'. The 'integrability' of Cagan money demand was shown again later by Calvo and Leiderman (1992) .
Proposition 2. In a MIUF economy, characterized by the set of assumptions [A1] to [A6], [A7 0 ], and [A8] to [A10], the 'integrable' Cagan money demand with perfect foresight does not comply with money essentiality.
Proof. Using a utility function for money services v(m) shows the 'integrability' of Cagan money demand:
vðmÞ ¼ u 0 ðy À gÞa À1 ð1 þ g þ ar À log mÞm for all 0 < m < e gþar :
The latter utility function for money services will deliver, through the first-order equation (3), the famous semi-log Cagan money demand (log m 5 g À ap, with g a constant and a a positive constant). The current MIUF model will resume in the inflationary finance Cagan model. However, such a utility function for money services does not comply with money essentiality requirement since for the latter utility function lim m!0 þ mv 0 ðmÞ ¼ 0. Then, it will not allow the modelling of monetary hyperinflation as stated in Proposition 1. & Proposition 2 contributes to understanding the failure of the traditional model of hyperinflation with perfect foresight. According to proposition 2, this class of models with perfect foresight is not capable of generating accelerating inflation. The reason is that the Cagan semi-log function of the demand for money does not capture the essentiality of money. Both Cagan (1956, pp. 55-56) and Flood and Garber (1980, p. 750) find that the semi-log function underpredicts substantially the demand for real cash balances in the latter stages of some hyperinflations. Cagan (1956, p. 55 ) explains that such underpredictions could be due to the expectation of imminent monetary reform leading individuals to hold higher real cash balances than they would desire according to the semi-log function of the demand for money. The alternative explanation, relying on Proposition 2, is that r 2011 The Author German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik the Cagan schedule does not capture the essentiality of money in the economy. This feature may explain the substantial underestimation of the holdings of real cash balances near the end of hyperinflations. Therefore, the substantial underprediction of the Cagan semi-log demand for money found at the end of some hyperinflations may be seen as an empirical evidence of the failure of this functional form to capture the essentiality of money.
CIA ECONOMY, HYPERINFLATION AND MONEY ESSENTIALITY
Here for the CIA setup, we are adapting the basic setup of section 2 by keeping all assumptions from [A1] to [A5] and from [A8] to [A10]. The CIA setup below differs, however, from the first in two aspects. First, assumption [A6] is replaced by assumption [A6b] stating that the representative household's preferences are represented by a general class of utility functions depending only on the level of real consumption. Accordingly, the household utility at time 0 is
The function U belongs to a general class of utility functions increasing and strictly concave in its single argument, real good consumption: assumption [A7] is replaced by assumption [A7b]. Second, in a CIA economy the role of money as a medium of exchange is captured by a cash-in-advance constraint assuming that money holding is strictly essential to buy the consumption good (assumption [A7c]). In order to consume c units of the consumption good at time t, the household must hold a stock of real cash balances, m, greater or equal to c: m t Zc t :
In this nonstochastic environment assuming that the nominal interest rate i is greater than zero, meaning that money is return-dominated by government bond, it follows that the CIA constraint must hold with equality:
The representative household's optimization problem, consisting of maximizing (11) subject to the constraints given by (2) and (12), leads to the following firstorder condition:
The associated Lagrange multiplier l is constant with respect to time because the agent's rate of time preference equals the real rate of interest. According to (12), real cash balances will indirectly enter the utility function. Equation (13) characterizes a demand for real money balances decreasing with respect to the rate of inflation (or the cost of holding cash balances) because the utility function U is strictly concave.
The transversality condition implies that lim t!1 e Àrt lw t ¼ 0:
By using the definition of the nominal interest rate, the first order condition (13) can be written as follows:
As in usual inflationary finance models, a constant per capita government budget deficit, d, is financed by issuing high-powered money. The law of motion for real money balances in this CIA inflationary finance model will be provided by combining (6) and (15), leading to
On the basis of the same methodology and the same argumentation developed in section 2, the possibility of explosive hyperinflation paths depends on condition (8) leading to the following condition for the CIA economy (dropping the time index for convenience)
In the same way as in section 2 in the framework of a MIUF economy, condition (17) relates the possibility of explosive hyperinflation to a sufficient level of money essentiality. Moreover, this sufficient level of money essentiality is conveyed by the agent's preferences. According to (15), inflation tax is given by
From a mathematical point of view, it appears that condition (17), allowing the model to generate possible explosive hyperinflations paths, is similar to condition (9) in the MIUF model. Condition (17) is particularly similar to condition (10) in the MIUF case with a class of additive-separable utility functions. Proof. The proof relies on previous arguments. &
As in the first proof, the possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths is a discussion about a sufficient level of money essentiality. Proposition 3 states that the higher the fiscal deficit to be financed through money creation, the more essential the money should be to make the development of hyperinflation feasible in this CIA framework. The same economic intuition applies as that provided for the meaning of Proposition 1. The CIA model presents exactly the same kind of limitations as the MIUF model for characterizing explosive hyperinflation paths r 2011 The Author German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik 1 3 5 with perfect foresight. The CIA constraint does not convey by itself sufficient money essentiality even if it makes money necessary for the transactions. The sufficient level of money essentiality is conveyed by the representative agent preferences.
Proposition 4. According to proposition 3, in a CIA economy, characterized by the set of assumptions [A1] to [A5], [A6b], [A7b], [A7c], and [A8] to [A10], the 'integrable' Cagan money demand with perfect foresight does not comply with money essentiality.
Proof. Using the following household's utility function shows the 'integrability' of the Cagan money demand in the CIA setup:
The latter household's utility function will deliver through the first-order equation (13) the famous semi-logarithmic Cagan money demand (log m 5 g À ap, with g a constant and a a positive constant). The current CIA model will resume in the inflationary finance Cagan model. However, such a utility function does not comply with the money essentiality requirement since for the latter utility function lim m!0 þ mU 0 ðmÞ ¼ 0. Then, it will not allow the modelling of monetary hyperinflation as stated in Proposition 3. &
In the same way as Proposition 2, this fourth proposition contributes to the explanation of the empirical evidence that the Cagan schedule does not appropriately explain the end stages of some hyperinflations (Engsted, 1998; Petrovic and Vujosevic, 1996) , and that it substantially underpredicts real cash balances (Cagan, 1956; Flood and Garber, 1980) . Proposition 4 shows that the Cagan schedule does not capture the essentiality of money in the economy. Thereby, it explains the substantial underestimation of the holdings of real cash balances found near the end of some hyperinflations.
According to the CIA constraint (12), household real consumption will fall along explosive hyperinflation paths characterized by the declining value of real money balances. The fall of households' real consumption will cause an increasing loss of welfare and represent the harmful effect of hyperinflation on the CIA economy. Some evidence exists to support this result. As pointed out by Vazquez (1998) , Webb (1989) in his Table 5 .4 shows evidence that consumption fell dramatically during German hyperinflation. The recent collapse of the Zimbabwean economy illustrates the same point.
THE APPROPRIATE SPECIFICATION OF THE DEMAND FOR MONEY IN HYPERINFLATION
Money essentiality is closely related to the inelasticity of the demand for money with respect to the cost of holding cash balances. We define the function f(m) measuring the cost of money services according to Proposition 5. According to propositions 1 and 3, any differentiable money demand function inelastic with respect to the cost of holding cash balances is consistent with money essentiality. Moreover, if the function complies with lim m!0 þ f ðmÞ > d then it will allow the modelling of monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight.
Proof. The first derivative of f(m) is
where e represents the elasticity of the money demand with respect to the nominal interest rate. If the money demand is interest-rate inelastic, jej < 1, then f 0 (m)o0.
Since f(m) ! 0 and f 0 (m)o0 when the money demand is inelastic, it follows that lim m!0 þ f ðmÞ > 0. Then, we have This point implies that when the money demand is interest rate-inelastic then money is essential. Proposition 1 and Proposition 3 complete the proof. & Barbosa et al. (2006) , in a similar framework, point out the role of the inelasticity of money demand functions with respect to the nominal interest rate for the possibility of an explosive inflation path, but insist on the need of an increasing deficit. On the other hand, our results emphasize the importance of the role of money essentiality and are established with a constant deficit without needing an increasing deficit.
The economic intuition of the requirement of the inelasticity of the demand for money with respect to the cost of holdings of cash balances follows from the meaning of the money essentiality requirement. The government exploits the essentiality of money to get sufficiently large inflation tax to finance its fiscal deficit. The government budget constraint (6) implies that, alongside the hyperinflationary path, the inflation tax has to grow as the same pace as _ m decreases in order to keep d constant. In this perfect foresight environment, this condition requires that the inflation tax rate increases faster than the inflation tax base decreases meaning that the demand for real cash balances should be inelastic with respect to the rate of inflation. It is worth noticing that Ashworth and Evans (1998) and Petrovic and Mladenovic (2000) find empirical support for the r 2011 The Author German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik functional form of the demand for money with inflation elasticity as a decreasing function of inflation.
Proposition 5 establishes that inelastic money demand functions complying with a sufficient level of money essentiality can be candidates for replacing the famous Cagan semi-log schedule. Among them the double-log schedule with perfect foresight may be distinguished:
with d constant. This money demand functional form exhibits a constant elasticity with respect to the inflation rate lower than one. Proposition 6. According to propositions 1 and 3, the 'integrable' double-log schedule with 0obo1 is an appropriate candidate of functional form to replace the Cagan money demand function in the analysis of monetary hyperinflation with perfect foresight.
Proof. As shown by Kingston (1982) , the double-log schedule is 'integrable' in a MIUF setup. Using the setup of a MIUF economy with additive-separable utility function for example, one can easily verify that using a utility function for money services v(m) such as
will provide microeconomic foundations to the double-log schedule. The money demand function described by the double-log schedule complies with Proposition 1, as shown by the following calculation:
The double-log schedule is also 'integrable' in the CIA setup of section 3. Using a utility function such as
will also provide microeconomic foundations to the double-log schedule complying with Proposition 3 since for the latter we have: Ashworth and Evans (1998) provided empirical support to the inflation inelastic double-log schedule. Proposition 6 may be seen as providing a theoretical support.
CONCLUSION
Insights from two standard optimizing monetary settings (MIUF and CIA) and economic reasoning from empirical literature and case studies of extreme hyperinflation episodes provide relevant requirements for the specification of the demand for money during hyperinflation. This paper shows that the possibility of perfect-foresight explosive monetary hyperinflation paths requires households to consider money as sufficiently essential to the system. Also, it is clear that whether in the MIUF or in the CIA framework, the appropriate level of money essentiality is conveyed by the representative agent's preferences, and does not depend on the way of modelling the role of money as a medium of exchange. 6 Therefore, the paper establishes a robust theoretical link between the possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths and the essentiality of money.
The economic intuition of this result is multifaceted. A sufficient level of money essentiality is crucial in inflationary finance models of hyperinflation because an affected government needs to raise sufficient inflation tax and, hence, needs the money to be essential to the system when inflation explodes. Inflationary finance models of hyperinflation need to take into account that the inflation tax remains sufficient to generate the required amount of seigniorage, even when the inflation rates explode and real cash balances shrink. In addition, the use of domestic money is essential for transactions even during the most severe hyperinflations because of the general unwillingness among the agents to resort to barter (Casella and Feinstein, 1990) . Moreover, extreme inflation substantially reduces the use of 6. It should be noticed that Feenstra (1986) shows that a functional equivalence exists between putting real cash balances in the utility function and modelling the transaction role of money with a cashin-advance setup. According to Feenstra (1986, p. 285 ) 'cash-in-advance constraints are an important special case of a utility function which includes real balances'.
r 2011 The Author German Economic Review r 2011 Verein für Socialpolitik long-term contracts and credit transactions (Gutierrez and Vazquez, 2004) . The institutional framework also may contribute to the essentiality of money for the transactions. By declaring the money to be the unique legal tender in the economy, the government can enforce the essentiality of money for transactions. Legal restrictions prohibiting the use or the holding of foreign currency (Casella and Feinstein, 1990 ) and requirements to pay some fiscal taxes or parastatal services with money ensures for the government a sufficient level of money essentiality and thereby, a sufficient level of the inflation tax. In the case of the recent extreme hyperinflation in Zimbabwe, the use of foreign currency in transactions was strictly forbidden, and parastatal services were required to be paid in domestic money. This enforced the use of Zimbabwe dollars for everyday transactions up until the very end of hyperinflation ( Pilossof, 2009 ). Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the hyperinflationary process develops only because the agents need to use the money for the transactions. Money is the medium of hyperinflation. The essentiality of money for the transactions explains the release by the government of banknotes of ever-higher values typical of the hyperinflation episodes. The development of hyperinflation and the essentiality of money for the transactions require the issue of ever-larger denominations banknotes. The importance of the issue of the essentiality of money has been already raised in the literature of speculative hyperinflations as in Barbosa and Cunha (2003) . It is confirmed in this paper in the monetary model of hyperinflation with perfect foresight. Further research may be conducted to better assess the robustness of this result to alternative ways of modelling the transaction role of money as in searchtheoretic approaches for example. Moreover, as this paper's attention has been restricted to perfect-foresight equilibria, further research could be also conducted to deal with rational expectations equilibria in a stochastic environment.
The result of the theoretical link between the possibility of monetary hyperinflation paths and the essentiality of money leads to two contributions to the monetary analysis of hyperinflation. First, it contributes to the understanding of the well-known failure of Cagan inflationary finance models dynamics with perfect foresight. The semi-log schedule of the famous Cagan money demand with perfect foresight is shown not to comply with money essentiality either in the MIUF or in the CIA setup. Furthermore, this noncompliance helps explain the empirical evidence showing that the Cagan schedule does not appropriately correspond to the end stages of some hyperinflations (Engsted, 1998; Petrovic and Vujosevic, 1996) , and that it substantially underpredicts real cash balances (Cagan, 1956; Flood and Garber, 1980) . Second, the link contributes to the applied literature by providing a test of the sufficient essentiality of money for the appropriate specification of the demand for money for empirical studies of hyperinflation. A similar test of the money essentiality for empirical studies has also been suggested in Barbosa and Cunha (2003) to address the issue of the exclusion of speculative hyperinflation paths. This paper confirms the importance of such a test in the choice of appropriate functional forms of the demand for money in empirical studies of hyperinflation.
A class of inflation inelastic money demand functions has been shown to be an appropriate candidate to replace the popular semi-log schedule in the analysis of explosive hyperinflation. This paper provides a particular and robust theoretical justification to the double-log schedule with perfect foresight. Ashworth and Evans (1998) provided an empirical support to functional forms in which the absolute inflation elasticity is a decreasing function of inflation, and particularly to the inflation inelastic double-log or log-linear schedule. Therefore, this paper may be considered as complementary to Ashworth and Evans (1998) by giving theoretical support to the log-linear specification of the demand for money in the analysis of hyperinflation. Further research may be conducted on alternative appropriate forms of the demand for real cash balances complying with the money essentiality requirement. The recent extreme Zimbabwean hyperinflation episode may give rise to new empirical studies of hyperinflation using the log-linear schedule for the specification of the demand for money.
